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1 Introduction
The pluralistic view of politics pushed forward by political scientists in last four decades
has highlighted the important role played by special interests in shaping political decision-
making.1 One major thrust of this literature is that competition between interest groups
should induce e¢ cient and balanced policies and that, as a result, a large political repres-
entation of private interests ensures that policies are better aligned with social welfare.
The paradigm to model pluralistic politics namely the common agency modelof policy
formation provides a theoretical support to this conclusion. This model was cast earlier by
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) in a complete information abstract framework and then
adapted by Grossman and Helpman (1994) and others towards various political economy
applications (international trade, tax policies, regulation, etc.). Under common agency,
competing lobbying groups (the principals) design non-cooperatively contributions to in-
uence a decision-maker (the agent). At equilibrium, all organized interest groups actively
contribute whatever their ideological distances to the decision-maker. This decision-maker
chooses which contributions to accept and the policy to implement. Under complete in-
formation, this decentralized political process is e¢ cient, i.e., the aggregate payo¤ of the
grand-coalition made of all principals and their common agent is maximized.
However, many economists have forcefully argued that politics is plagued with trans-
action costs resulting both from asymmetric information and the limited ability to enforce
contributions.2 All forms of casual and empirical evidence show that interest groups have
limited knowledge on legislatorspreferences and that this imperfect knowledge determ-
ines whether groups contribute or not and, if they do so, the size of their contributions.
For instance, Kroszner and Stratman (1999) and Stratman (2005) pointed out that in-
terest groups adopt di¤erent attitudes vis-à-vis young legislators whose preferences are
quite unknown compare to older legislators whose ideology has been better revealed by
their past response to earlier PACs contributions. Moreover, those contributions seem
to increase over time as legislators clarify their ideologies. Among others, Kroszner and
Stratman (1998) and Wright (1996) also provided strong evidence suggesting that the
ideological distance between an interest group and a decision-maker is key to assess the
importance of contributions.Wright (1996), for example, noticed that the National Auto-
mobile Dealers Association (NADA) contributed far more heavily to conservatives (78,1
percent) than to liberals (about 12 percent) during the election cycles 1979-1980 and
1981-1982. He suggested that such pattern might be explained by the close ideological
connection between members of NADA who are generally pro-business and conservative
politicians.
1Dahl (1961), Lowi (1979), Moe (1981), Truman (1952) and Wilson (1973) among others.
2Dixit (1996).
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In this paper, we revisit the common agency model of pluralistic politics but, to ac-
count for reported evidence, we introduce asymmetric information between interest groups
and decision-makers whose ideologies are privately known. Asymmetric information cre-
ates transaction costs in the relationships between interest groups and the decision-makers.
Limited activism by some interest groups, segmentation of the market for inuence and
weak contributions reect these existing transaction costs. Our theory provides thus a
richer pattern of equilibrium behaviors than predicted by complete information models;
a pattern better suited to reconcile theory with the evidences stressed above.
First, far from aggregating the preferences of interest groups e¢ ciently, equilibrium
policies might not be as responsive to private interests as in a frictionless world. This
phenomenon can be so pronounced that a laissez-faireequilibrium might arise with the
decision-maker, free from any inuence, choosing his own ideal policy. Second, due to
frictions caused by asymmetric information, interest groups may choose to target only
decision-makers who are ideologically close and thus easier to inuence. They eschew
contributions for ideologically distant decision-makers because of high transaction costs.
This feature explains the prevalence of one-lobby inuence in environments where interest
groups are su¢ ciently polarized.
To obtain these results, we consider two interest groups and a decision-maker who all
have quadratic spatial preferences with ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space.3
Interest groups have ideal points located on both sides of the policy space. These assump-
tions allow us to parameterize equilibrium patterns with respect to rstly, the ideological
distances between interest groups and the decision-maker; and secondly, the degree of po-
larization between groups. The decision-maker has private information on his ideal point.
This is meant to capture the existing uncertainty on the ideological bias of key decision-
makers in the political process and the limited knowledge that interest groups may have
on the decision-makers ideology. Groups non-cooperatively design contributions not only
to inuence the decision-makers choice as in the case of complete information, but also
to elicit revelation of his preferences. The decision-maker gives di¤erent weights to his
ideological concerns and to the contributions he receives from interest groups.
In a delegated common agency model, all principals observe and contract on the same
variable, namely the policy chosen by the agent, but the agent is free to choose any subset
of contracts. Competing interest groups o¤er contributions not only to elicit the decision-
makers true preferences but also to shift policies towards their own ideal points. Since a
given interest group does not internalize the impact of others modifying their own contri-
bution to extract the decision-makers information rent, there is excessive rent extraction
in equilibrium. The marginal contributions of an interest group then no longer reects its
3The assumption that policies result from the inuence of two competing groups is common in the
empirical literature. See for instance Kroszner and Stratman (1999) and Gawande et al. (2005).
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marginal utility among alternative policies as in the case of complete information; they
are always too low and sometimes can even be null. As a result, equilibrium policies are
pushed towards the decision-makers ideal point. Lobbying competition, far from reach-
ing e¢ ciency, shifts the balance of power signicantly towards the decision-maker. The
decision-maker may thus nd more worthwhile to refuse contributions, especially when
he is ideologically too distant from the contributing interest group.
Altogether, asymmetric information and competition thus provide a much less op-
timistic view of the political process than predicted by complete information models of
pluralistic politics. Equilibrium patterns under asymmetric information might signic-
antly di¤er according to the importance the decision-maker attributes to his own ideology,
the extent of ideological uncertainty, and the degree of polarization between competing
interest groups. When the decision-makers ideological bias is large enough and groups
are su¢ ciently polarized, there exists a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium is char-
acterized by larger contributions and information rents for extreme decision-makers but
also by segmented areas of inuence for interest groups. When polarization between in-
terest groups is small compared to ideological uncertainty, it is quite likely that interest
groups end up being closer to each other than to the decision-maker. Their only concern
is then to coordinate contributions. Multiple equilibria may arise from miscoordination
problems. Contributions overlap and the more moderate decision-makers secure greater
contributions and more information rent. Counter-lobbying always arises in equilibrium.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) and
others, the bulk of the common agency literature explaining interest groupsbehavior
has focused on complete information. Fewer contributions have explicitly analyzed the
transaction costs of contracting due to asymmetric information between those principals
and their agent and how these costs a¤ect the pattern of contributions and the political
landscape. Under moral hazard, i.e., when the decision-makers action (or e¤ort) is non-
veriable, Dixit (1996) argued that a bureaucracy subject to the conicting inuences of
various legislative committees/interest groups may end up having very low incentives for
exerting e¤ort but, because of an implicit focus on models of intrinsic common agency,
groups do not eschew contributions.
Le Breton and Salanié (2003) considered a decision-maker who has private information
on the weight he gives to social welfare in his objective function. A discrete political
decision may be favored by some groups while others oppose it. Groups only contribute
for their most preferred option. In such contexts, an interest group is active only upon
learning that it is not too costly to move the decision-maker away from social welfare
maximization.
Epstein and OHalloran (2004) also studied a common agency model with spatial pref-
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erence similar to ours but with the decision-makers ideal point taking only two possible
values. Restricting the analysis to direct mechanisms, they gave much attention to the
case of several interest groups and their incentives to collude.
Restricted participation of interest groups and low equilibrium contributions have
already found other rationales in the literature. Mitra (1999) (under complete informa-
tion) and Martimort and Semenov (2007b) (under symmetric but incomplete information)
investigated how the equilibrium payo¤s from the common agency game where interest
groups play with public o¢ cials determine whether the interest groups nd worth to enter
the political arena if the groups face some exogenous xed-cost of organization. Merging
a common agency model of lobbying with legislative bargaining, Helpman and Persson
(2001) demonstrated that equilibrium contributions may be quite small and still have a
signicant impact on policies. Lastly, Felli and Merlo (2006) argued that some interest
groups may not participate in the lobbying process in a model with active voters and can-
didates choosing from which lobbies they want support. They also found some tendency
towards moderate policies but for di¤erent reasons from ours.
Section 2 presents the model and the complete information benchmark. Section 3
analyzes a hypothetical benchmark where interest groups cooperatively design their con-
tribution. Section 4 deals with the case of competing interest groups and characterize
various equilibrium patterns. Section 5 summarizes the main results. Proofs are releg-
ated to an Appendix.
2 The Model and Complete Information Benchmark
Two polarized interest groups P1 and P2 (also referred to as the principals) simultaneously
o¤er contributions to inuence a political decision-maker (common agent). Let q 2 R be
a one-dimensional policy parameter over which the decision-maker has control. Interest
group Pi (i = 1; 2) has a quasi-linear and quadratic utility function over policies and
monetary transfers ti which is given by:
Vi(q; ti) =  1
2
(q   ai)2   ti:
The parameter ai is Pis ideal point in the one-dimensional policy space. We assume that
principalsideal points are symmetrically located around the origin, a1 =  a2 = a > 0.
The decision-maker has similar quasi-linear preferences given by:
U
 
q;
2X
i=1
ti; 
!
=  
2
(q   )2 +
2X
i=1
ti;
where   0:
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The decision-maker has private information on his ideal policy . This parameter is
uniformly distributed on a set  = [ ; ] centered around zero with  representing the
degree of ideological uncertainty. Since for our analysis and for interpretation of results
only the ratio a

matters, we in what follows put a = 1: The parameter 1

can then be
viewed as the degree of polarization between the two organized groups on the particular
policy.
Interest groups inuence the decision-maker by o¤ering nonlinear non-negative contri-
butions ti(q)  0; which specify a monetary transfer depending on the decision q that the
agent takes. The set of feasible transfers is assumed to consists of continuous, piece-wise
di¤erentiable functions of the policy variable q.
Timing: The timing of the game unfolds as follows:
 The decision-maker learns his ideal point ;
 Interest groups non-cooperatively o¤er contributions ft1(q); t2(q)g to the agent;
 The decision-maker decides whether to accept or refuse each of these o¤ers. If he
refuses all o¤ers, he gets his status quo payo¤ normalized at zero;
 Finally, the decision-maker chooses the policy q and receives the corresponding
payments from the interest groups whose o¤ers have been accepted.
The timing of the game is of interim contracting when the contract is done only when
the privately informed party observes its type. Note that since the transfers assumed
to be non-negative, it is weakly dominant strategy for the decision-maker to accept all
o¤ers.4 Thus although the decision-maker formally has right to choose any set of o¤ers
(delegated common agency) in equilibrium he accepts all of them. The agents outside
opportunity if he refuses all contributions is in fact his payo¤ if he chooses his own ideal
policy. We will refer to this setting as a laissez-faireoutcome.
The equilibrium concept we employ is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
Interpretation of variables: The principals can be thought of as two legislative Com-
mittees willing to inuence a regulatory agency or as two lobbying groups dealing with
an elected political decision-maker. Then the policy variable q can be a regulated price,
an import tari¤, a wage level or a number of permits depending on the application under
scrutiny.
In our paper we depart from the literature on common agency with asymmetric inform-
ation where the principals are aligned in their interests and the issue was not competition
4We thank referee for noticing that.
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but coordination. Competition between lobbies assumes some degree of conict between
them. In a unidimensional framework this conict is easily captured by diametrically op-
posed principals. Trade policy gives an interesting example of such diametrically opposed
preferences for interest groups. Typically, upstream producers may want tari¤s for the
downstream product to be low whereas downstream producers want them to be high.5
The parameter  characterizes how the agent trades o¤ contributions against his own
ideological bias. As  increases, the agent values less monetary transfers and puts more
emphasis on ideology. Principals have thus to spend more to inuence the agent. A
stronger ideological bias is expected on issues of much relevance for the public at large
because the decision-makers ideology plays then an important role for reelection. Mac-
roeconomic issues such as unemployment, debt, ination may fall into this category. A
weaker ideological bias is more likely in the case of issues which might appear too technical
to the general public. Regulatory and trade policies are relevant examples. Goldberg and
Maggi (1999) estimated  in the U.S. patterns of protection to be between 50 and 88.
Bradford (2003) suggested a lower value of  but still higher than one.
Lobbying groups usually have publicly known ideal policies. In some extent these ideal
policies determine the very nature of special interest groups. Politician may have bias to-
wards some policies which can be observed through his history of voting. However, the
mere existence of lobbying competition assumes the uncertainty of the decision-makers
position. We model this in a crude way: The agent is moderate when his ideal point
lies near the origin and more extreme otherwise. Following the earlier works of Niskanen
(1971) and La¤ont and Tirole (1993) among others, we thus envision the bureaucrat (or
the policy-maker) as having private information. In Niskanen (1971), information is re-
lated to the production function of the bureaucrats services. In La¤ont and Tirole (1993)
information is related to the monitoring task that this bureaucrat undertakes.Stratman
(2005) argued that interest groups face signicant uncertainty on the preferences of legis-
lators and that this uncertainty can only be alleviated over time by seeing how legislators
respond through their voting behavior to PACscontributions. Higher uncertainty may
thus arise for younger legislators who have not yet revealed much on their preferences.
Justication of assumptions of the model: The quadratic form of utilities is a
standard assumption in the political economy literature.6 This assumption can be relaxed
by considering concave-single peaked utilities. However, sharp predictions will be lost and
this generalization will come at cost of signicant complexity.
Symmetry of the principalsideal points makes the analysis simpler. Most of our results
can be generalized to the case of asymmetric principals at the cost of more cumbersome
5Gawande et al. (2005) provided an interesting empirical study along these lines.
6Austen-Smith and Banks (2000).
7
notations.7 In tandem with quadratic preferences, taking a uniform distribution of ideal
points yields tractability and thus sharp predictions on equilibrium policies and payo¤s.
The agents ideal point  being privately known, contributions also serve (as usual
in the screening literature) to elicit this parameter.In economic applications it is often
assumed that the transfers from the principals to the agent may not be negative. In the
companion paper8 to include the interesting cases of regulatory capture on the inception
stage, we assume for the ex ante contracting that the transfers are non negative in the
expected terms.
The most troublesome issue is related to the timing of the lobbying game. In the
absence of formally written contract and in the absence of Court who can enforce an
informal agreement the assumption that payments can be enforced is quite strong. In
the lobbying literature following Grossman and Helpman (1994) this assumption is mo-
tivated by an informal reputation argument that such payments are enforceable because
of prospective future interactions. Evidences in support of this model in trade can be
found in Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Bradford (2003). These evidences suggest that
the heuristic reputation argument seems to work, though it of course requires a formal
treatment in future.
To simplify the analysis, the set of feasible policies is the whole real line R. This
assumption is not restrictive: In all equilibria below, the range of policies is located
within the extreme ideal points of the players. Thus, considering the reduced form of
the model where the decision variable is free to change we, in fact, ex post satisfy the
constraints on q in a sense that it belongs to the region between the ideal points of the
players.
Common Agency under Complete Information: In a complete information frame-
work the e¢ cient policy will be implemented.9 The e¢ cient policy qFB() maximizes the
aggregate payo¤ of the grand coalition made of both principals and their common agent:
qFB() = argmax
q2R
(
2X
i=1
Vi(q; ti) + U
 
q;
2X
i=1
ti; 
!)
=

 + 2
: (1)
As the decision-makers ideological bias is stronger (i.e.,  increases), the optimal policy is
shifted towards his own ideal point. Nevertheless, this policy always reects both existing
groupspreferences. This e¢ cient policy is implemented at an equilibrium of the common
agency game provided that the interest groups commit to the following truthful concave
7In that case we will have to include a new parameter characterizing the degree of asymmetry between
principals.
8Martimort and Semenov (2007b).
9Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
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contributions:
ti(q) = max

0; 1
2
(q   ai)2   Ci

;
for some constant Ci and where we make explicit the dependence of this schedule on 
since this parameter is common knowledge. The agent is always (at least weakly) better
o¤accepting all such non-negative schedules, and with such payments, each interest group
Pi makes the decision-maker a residual claimant for the payo¤ of the bilateral coalition
they form altogether. This ensures an e¢ cient aggregation of preferences.
Although strict concavity of the objective functions ensures uniqueness of the e¢ cient
policy, many possible distributions of equilibrium payo¤s might be feasible. A payo¤
vector for the interest group corresponds to a pair (C1; C2) which ensures that the agent
is at least as well-o¤ by taking both contracts than accepting only a contribution from
one group.
3 The Benchmark of a Coalition of Interest Groups
Under asymmetric information, the decision-maker might get some information rent even
when contributions are cooperatively designed had interest groups merged into a single
entity. Of course, the optimal policy is no longer e¢ cient as a result of a trade-o¤between
rent extraction and allocative e¢ ciency.
The merged entity has now an objective which can be written as:
VM(q; t) =  1
2
f(q   1)2 + (q + 1)2g   t;
where t is now the groupsjoint contribution. The merged entitys ideal point is located
at zero. This principal gives more weight to ideology than each interest group separately.
Instead of using the truthful direct revelation mechanism the principal can give up
any communication and o¤er the agent a nonlinear contribution schedule t(q):10 Let us
denote by U() the agents payo¤ when he accepts the contribution t(q) and q() the
corresponding optimal policy. By denition, we have:
U() = max
q2R

t(q)  
2
(q   )2

and q() = argmax
q2R

t(q)  
2
(q   )2

:
The following Lemma characterizes the implementable proles fU(); q()g.
Lemma 1 : U() and q () are almost everywhere di¤erentiable with, at any di¤erenti-
ability point,
_U () =  (q ()  ) ; (2)
10Taxation Principle, see Rochet (1985).
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_q ()  0: (3)
The set of incentive constraints in the decision-makers problem is equivalent to condi-
tions (2) and (3). Condition (2) is obtained from the rst-order conditions of the agents
optimization problem (local optimality). Condition (3) guarantees the global optimality
of the allocation. Together, these conditions fully describe the set of implementable alloc-
ations. Hence, under interim contracting, the merged entity solves the following problem:
(PM) : max
fq();U()g
Z 
 

 1
2
(q()  1)2   1
2
(q() + 1)2   
2
(q()  )2   U()

d
2
;
subject to _U () = (q ()  ); (2)
_q ()  0; (3)
and U()  0; for all  2 : (4)
As usual in screening models, the subset of types where the interim participation con-
straint (4) binds plays an important role. Contrary to standard screening models where
agents have monotonic preferences in terms of the policy choice, the slope of the agents
rent does not necessarily keep a constant sign and the participation constraint may not
necessarily bind at the end-points .11 To get a full description of the optimum and
limit technicalities associated to that non-standard feature of the screening problem, we
will rely on the quadratic utility functions and the fact that the distribution of the agents
ideal point is uniform.
Proposition 1 : Assume that interest groups jointly design contributions. The op-
timal policy qM () and the decision-makers information rent UM () both depend on
the decision-makers ideological bias.
Weak Ideological Bias, 0 <  < 2.
 The optimal policy is ine¢ cient and distorted towards the decision-makers ideal
point: qM () = 2
+2
; for any  2 ;
 Only moderate decision-makers get information rent, extreme ones dont. This in-
formation rent is non-negative, zero at both endpoints , and strictly concave:
UM () =
 (2  )
2 ( + 2)
 
2   2 ; for any  2 ;
11This is reminiscent to the analysis of countervailing incentives explored by Lewis and Sappington
(1989) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995).
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 The coalition of interest groups o¤ers a positive and strictly concave contribution on
its positive part which is maximized for the most moderate decision-maker:
tM (q) = max

0; (2  )
4
q2 +
 (2  )
2 ( + 2)
2

; for any q:
Strong Ideological Bias,   2.
 The optimal policy always coincides with the decision-makers ideal point: qM () =
; for any  2 ;
 The decision-makers information rent is always zero: UM () = 0; for any  2 ;
 There is no contribution.
Under asymmetric information, policies are ine¢ cient and are always closer to the agents
ideal policy than under complete information. For intuition, consider the hypothetical
case where the merged entity still wants to reward the decision-maker for implementing
an e¢ cient policy qFB() = 
+2
, exactly as under complete information. To induce the
decision-maker to reveal his ideal point, he must receive some information rent. The
corresponding rent prole is rather concave with a steep increasing part on [ ; 0] (with
slope 2
+2
) and a steep decreasing part on [0; ] (with slope   2
+2
).12 Of course, this rent
is viewed as costly from the point of view of the coalition of interest groups. Reducing this
rent is done by making it somewhat atter, i.e., by better aligning the policy q() with
the decision-makers ideal point so that the quantity q()    is reduced in (2). Shifting
the optimal policy towards the agents ideal point and making it more sensitive to his
ideological preferences reduces the agents rent.
The impact of asymmetric information under monopolistic screening is thus akin to
an increase of the agents bargaining weight within the grand-coalition, making his pref-
erences more relevant to evaluate policy outcomes.
The decision-makers rent decreases with his ideological distance with the merged prin-
cipal. This is an important feature of optimal contracting under monopolistic screening.
Remember that the coalition of interest groups has preferences which are aligned with
those of a decision-maker lying in the middle of the ideology space. Inducing less mod-
erate types to adopt a policy closer to that of the coalition requires giving them enough
contributions and that may be found attractive by the more moderate types. Those types
have incentives to pretend being more extreme. To avoid this problem, the coalition of
12The nonlinear contribution tFB(q) = 
2
+2   q2 generates this prole and ensures that all types
participate with the most extreme decision-makers being just indi¤erent between participating or not.
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interest groups concedes that the policy implemented will be ine¢ cient and thus closer
to that of more extreme decision-makers. Second, more moderate decision-makers receive
an information rent to avoid taking more extreme stances.
When the decision-maker has a su¢ ciently strong ideological bias (  2), it becomes
too costly for interest groups to move the decision-maker away from his ideal point. The
merged entity prefers not contributing at all and always let the agent choose his ideal
point. Inuence has to be easy to buy to allow the coalition of interest groups to overcome
the cost of asymmetric information and have access to the decision-maker. Otherwise,
transaction costs of asymmetric information keep the coalition of interest groups outside
of the political process. This e¤ect will be signicantly magnied when interest groups
compete since it appears for lower values of .
4 Competition Between Interest Groups
So far, our analysis has only emphasized informational asymmetries as the only potential
source of rent for the decision-maker. Competition between interest groups and their
conicting desires to inuence the decision-maker introduces another source of rent under
competitive screening.
We focus on pure strategy equilibria of the common agency game. A deterministic
contract between the interest group Pi and the decision-maker is a nonlinear contribution
ti(q) which maps the decision-makers choice of the policy to the transfer paid by Pi:
The Taxation Principle says that for any direct incentive compatible mechanism there
exists a contribution schedule ti(q) that implements the same outcome. Contrary to the
standard version of the Revelation principle, this Taxation Principle is still useful in non-
cooperative screening environments. Peters (2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002) show
that there is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to the case where principals
compete through nonlinear contributions ti(q) (i = 1; 2).
Let us denote by U() the decision-makers payo¤when he accepts both contributions
ft1(q); t2(q)g and let q() be the chosen policy. The rent-policy prole fU(); q()g which
is implemented by the pair of contributions ft1(q); t2(q)g satises:
U() = max
q2R
(
2X
i=1
ti(q)  
2
(q   )2
)
and q() = argmax
q2R
(
2X
i=1
ti(q)  
2
(q   )2
)
:
Similarly, the rent-policy prole fUi(); qi()g that is implemented had the agent only
accepted principal Pis contribution is dened as:
Ui() = max
q2R

ti(q)  
2
(q   )2

and qi() = argmax
q2R

ti(q)  
2
(q   )2

:
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For a given contribution t i(q) o¤ered by principal P i, principal Pis best-response
solves now the following problem:
(PCi ) : maxfq();U()g
Z 
 

 1
2
(q()  ai)2   
2
(q()  )2 + t i(q())  U()

d
2
;
subject to _U () = (q ()  ); (2)
_q ()  0; (3)
U()  0; (4)
and U()  U i() for all  2 : (5)
The new participation constraint (5) ensures that the decision-maker prefers taking both
contributions rather than accepting only P is contract. The immediate consequence of
the non-negativity of transfers is that the ex post zero participation constraint (4) is
always implied by (5).
Denition 1 : A subgame-perfect equilibrium of the common agency game under asym-
metric information is a pair of contributions ft1(); t2()g which implement a rent-policy
prole fU(); q()g solving both (PC1 ) and (PC2 ).
To solve the problem (PCi ) given the contribution schedule t i(q) we form a Hamilto-
nian of the system:
Hi (U; q; i; ) =

 1
2
(q   ai)2   
2
(q   )2 + t i(q)  U

1
2
+ i (q   ) ;
where i is the co-state variable. Maximizing the Hamiltonian with respect to the control
variable q leads to the following rst-order condition:
  ( + 1) q () + ai +  + t0 i (q ()) + 2i ()  = 0: (6)
Di¤erent kinds of di¤erentiable equilibria may be sustained depending on the para-
meter values for  and . Those equilibria are characterized by di¤erent areas where the
participation constraint (5) binds. To compute the interest groupsequilibrium payo¤s,
we need to determine the decision-makers payo¤ when taking only one contract. To do
so requires to extend contributions for o¤ the equilibrium outputs as long as these con-
tributions remain non-negative.13 Following Martimort and Stole (2007), we shall focus
on equilibria with natural contributions which keep then the same analytical expressions
13This is a familiar argument from Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Klemperer and Meyer (1989) or
Martimort and Stole (2003) who reduced the problem of the multiplicity of equilibria in multiprincipals
settings by putting restrictions on out-of-equilibirum strategies.
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(6) both on and o¤ the equilibrium path as long as they are non-negative. One motiva-
tion for focusing on this particular extension is that the marginal contributions in those
equilibria are kept unchanged as the support of the type distribution is slightly enlarged
still keeping a uniform distribution on this enlarged support. In the rest of our analysis,
equilibria should be understood as being natural equilibria.
4.1 The Laissez-FaireEquilibrium: No Inuence
First, let us investigate whether there might exist an equilibrium such that none of the
interest groups ever contributes. As a result, the decision-maker always chooses his ideal
point: a laissez-faireoutcome. In this case, and although they are both organized, both
groups simultaneously eschew any contribution and look as being inactive.
Proposition 2 : Strong Ideological Bias/Large Ideological Uncertainty/Small
Polarization. Assume that   1 and that 1  . There is no contribution by either
interest group in the unique equilibrium. The decision-maker always chooses his ideal
point q() =  and gets zero information rent U() = 0 for all  2 .
Lobbying competition under asymmetric information signicantly erodes the interest
groupsinuence when the decision-maker puts enough weight on ideology and there is
enough ideological uncertainty, i.e., when the interest groupsideal points both lie within
the interval dened by the most extreme views of the agent.14 Everything happens then
as if the decision-maker was free from any inuence and could always choose his most
preferred policy.
The same zero-contribution outcome already occurred under merged contracting when
  2 (see Proposition 1). The point is that the non-cooperative behavior of principals
exacerbates this e¤ect which now arises also for lower levels of  as well, i.e., even when
the decision-maker gives only a moderate weight to his ideology.
To give some intuition on this result, let us think about the case with only one in-
terest group, say P1 and let us look for the optimal contribution that P1 o¤ers in such
a hypothetical monopolistic screening environment. Compared to the analysis performed
in Section 3, this single principal is now biased on one side of the policy space: He prefers
a higher policy than the decision-makers average ideal point. Also, ideology matters less
at the margin for this principal than for the merged entity since P1 does not care about
P2s utility. Even if both this biased principal and the merged entity have to give up the
same information rent in order to implement a given policy prole and should shift the
optimal policy towards the decision-makers ideal point by the same amount, P1 su¤ers
14It can be veried that this result is robust to introducing some asymmetry between interest groups.
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more from that increase than the merged entity. This implicit increase in the weight given
to the agents ideology erodes all P1s bargaining power when there is enough ideological
uncertainty. P1 no longer inuences the agents choice. Considering now the case of two
groups, an equilibrium where both principals do not contribute arises.
This result may explain the apparent nearly welfare-maximizing behavior of U.S.
policy-makers in some areas, especially trade policy. Using a complete information model,
Gawande at al. (2005) argued for instance that the competition between interest groups
(nal producers and intermediate ones) whose impacts cancel out might explain that the
estimated implicit weight given to contributions in the decision-makers preferences is low.
They nevertheless concluded their study by noticing that their estimated parameter is still
excessively high. Introducing asymmetric information in such analysis would magnify the
policy bias towards the agents ideal point (who may have as ideal point a social-welfare
maximizing policy) and might help to solve this empirical puzzle.
4.2 Partial Inuence: Non-Overlapping Areas
In the laissez-faireequilibrium, none of the interest groups secures any area of inuence.
Even when the ideological distance between the agent and an interest group is small, this
principal cannot make sure that the decision-maker will only follow his own recommend-
ation because there is too much uncertainty on the decision-makers preferences which
may be too far away from that of the group.
We now investigate conditions under which such unchallenged inuence occurs instead.
The market for inuence is then segmented with interest groups on both sides of the
political spectrum being linked in exclusive relationships with decision-makers who are
ideologically su¢ ciently close. We call such a pattern of inuence a partition equilibrium
of type 1. From Proposition 2, the degree of polarization between interest groups (resp.
the ideological uncertainty) must increase (resp. decrease) for such pattern to arise.
Denition 2 : In a partition equilibrium of type 1, principal Pi o¤ers a positive contri-
bution only on a non-empty subset 
i of . Moreover, the principalsareas of inuence
are disconnected, i.e., 
1\
2 = ;. A partition equilibrium of type 1 is symmetric (SPE1)
when there exists  2 (0; ) such that 
2 = [ ;  ] and 
1 = [ ; ]. We also denote by

0 = [  ;  ] the area where none of the principals contribute.
We provide below conditions ensuring existence and uniqueness of a SPE1.
Proposition 3 : Strong Ideological Bias/Intermediate Ideological Uncertainty.
Assume that  > 1 and  < 1  . The unique equilibrium of the common agency game
is a SPE1. Given that  =  1 =   2 =  1 1 , this equilibrium entails:
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 A policy q() which reects the preferences of the contributing interest group only
for the most extreme realizations of  and otherwise is equal to the decision-makers
ideal point
q () =
 2 ( 1) i
+1
if  2 
i;
 if  2 
0;
 The decision-makers information rent U() is convex and null only on 
0
U () =
(
( 1)
2(+1)
(    i)2 if  2 
i;
0 if  2 
0;
 Contributions are piecewise continuously di¤erentiable and convex
t1 (q) =
 ( 1)
4
(q   )2 if q   ;
0 otherwise;
t2 (q) =
 ( 1)
4
(q + )2 if q    ;
0 otherwise:
On Figures 1a and 1b, we have represented respectively equilibrium policy and con-
tributions with disconnected areas of inuence for parameters  = 2 and  = 0:7.
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-0.5
0.5
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y
Figure 1a. Policy q () - thick line,
laissez-fairepolicy - thin line, e¢ cient
policy - dashed line.
-0.5 0.0 0.5
0.01
0.02
q
Transfers
Figure 1b. Disconnected transfers: t1 (q) - solid
line, t2 (q) - dashed line.
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A partition equilibrium shares some common features with the laissez-faire equi-
librium. In both cases the decision-maker might be freed from the principalsinuence
but now this occurs only when the decision-maker is moderate enough. Interest groups
are now able to secure unchallenged inuence when their ideological distance with the
agent is su¢ ciently small. The most extreme decision-makers are thus linked in exclusive
relationships with their near-by groups.
To understand the shape of contributions and the equilibrium pattern, it is important
to rst think about the case where one principal, say P1, is alone and has more extreme
views than the agent (1  ). Under complete information, the optimal policy that such
bilateral coalition would implement would be an average of the respective ideal points of
the interest group and the decision-maker, namely q1() =
+1
+1
. The key observation
is that, when  > 1, this policy schedule is very sensitive to the agents ideal point.
The same is true of course for the policy that such bilateral coalition would implement
under asymmetric information. This sensitivity means that, as the agent becomes more
extreme, the di¤erence between his own ideal point and what the principal would like to
implement increases signicantly. Filling this gap requires an increasingly higher marginal
contribution as policies become more extreme and come closer to the principals ideal
point. This explains why equilibrium contributions are in fact convex and increase as the
ideological distance between the agent and the principal diminishes.
When ideology matters greatly to the decision-maker, the most extreme types obtain
a positive rent by pretending being more moderate than what they really are. To reduce
this rent, interest groups reduce contributions for more moderate types. Doing so is of
course constrained by the fact that the decision-maker may refuse any contribution and
choose his own ideal point. Contributions are thus null for moderate decision-makers
who are ideologically too far away. The limiting case being given by the laissez-faire
equilibrium of Proposition 2.
4.3 Partially Overlapping Areas of Inuence
Key to the result of Proposition 3 is the fact that interest groups are su¢ ciently far apart
to secure an unchallenged inuence on an ideologically adjacent decision-maker. Suppose
now that interest groups are more polarized, or alternatively that ideological uncertainty
diminishes. Transaction costs of contracting under asymmetric information diminish and
both interest groups su¤er less from not knowing the decision-makers preferences. Mod-
erate decision-makers receive now positive contributions from both interest groups. We
will call such a pattern of inuence a partition equilibrium of type 2 .
Denition 3 : In a partition equilibrium of type 2, principal Pi o¤ers a positive contri-
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bution only on a non-empty subset 
i of . Moreover, the principalsareas of inuence
overlap, i.e., 
1 \ 
2 = 
0 6= ; where 
0 is the area where both principals simultan-
eously intervene. A partition equilibrium of type 2 is symmetric (SPE2) when there
exists  2 (0; ) such that 
2 = [ ;  ] and 
1 = [  ; ].
We provide below the conditions ensuring existence of an SPE2. As in the case of
disconnected areas of inuence this equilibrium is unique.15
Proposition 4 : Strong Ideological Bias, More Polarization/Smaller Ideolo-
gical Uncertainty. Assume that  > 1 and  < 1  (2+1)
(+2)
. The unique equilibrium
of the common agency game is a SPE2. Denoting  = 1 , and  =  1 =   2 = (+2)( 1) ,
this equilibrium entails:
 A policy q() which reects the preferences of all groups only for moderate decision-
makers and is otherwise biased towards the preferences of the nearby group for ex-
treme ones
q () =
8><>:
2+
+1
if  2 [ ; ];
3
+2
if  2 [  ;  ];
2 
+1
if  2 [ ;  ];
 The decision-makers information rent U() is convex and minimized for the most
moderate type with U(0) = 3
2
 1 > 0;
 Contributions are convex and continuously di¤erentiable
t1 (q) =
8><>:
0 if q   3
 1 ;
( 1)
6
q2 + q + 3
2
2( 1) if q 2 [ 3 1 ; 3 1 ];
( 1)
4
q2 + 
2
q + 9
2
4( 1) if q  3 1 ;
t2 (q) =
8><>:
0 if q  3
 1 ;
( 1)
6
q2   q + 32
2( 1) if q 2 [ 3 1 ; 3 1 ];
( 1)
4
q2   
2
q + 9
2
4( 1) if q  3 1 :
On Figures 2a and 2b, we have represented respectively the equilibrium policy and
contributions with disconnected areas of inuence for parameters  = 2 and  = 0:47.
15Note that the set of parameter values corresponding to both types of equilibria do not overlap.
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Figure 2a. Policy q () - thick line,
laissez-fairepolicy - thin line, e¢ cient
policy - dashed line.
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0.05
0.10
q
Transfers
Figure 2b. Partially overlapping transfers:
t1 (q) - solid line, t

2 (q) - dashed line.
As polarization increases, each interest group nds it relatively easy to inuence nearby
types and is ready to give them a positive rent. The point is that, for the rival interest
group on the other side of the ideological space, policies led by those far away types may
be excessively biased towards opposite views. To counter this e¤ect, this second principal
must himself reward the agent even if the latter is on the opposite side of the ideological
spectrum. This strategy is of course valuable as long as the ideological distance with the
agent is not too large. In such cases, areas of inuence start overlapping for the most
moderate decision-makers.16
4.4 Fully Overlapping Areas of Inuence
We distinguish now between two cases depending on whether or not the ideology matters
greatly in the decision-makers utility function.
4.4.1 Strong Ideological Bias
Proposition 4 already shows that, as ideological uncertainty decreases, the interest groups
areas of inuence start overlapping. When uncertainty is small enough or alternatively
when the degree of polarization is su¢ ciently large, both groups are able to always inu-
ence the decision-maker whatever his own ideal point is as shown in the next proposition.
16This result is due to our assumption of interim contracting, i.e., the decision-maker accepts contribu-
tions after knowing his own ideology. Moving policy towards his own ideal point requires that a principal
o¤ers a positive contribution to the informed agent. Under competition, contributions must thus be piled
up for the most moderate types to keep them choosing a balanced policy.
19
Proposition 5 : Strong Ideological Bias, Large Polarization/Small Ideological
Uncertainty. Assume that  > 1 and 1 > (2+1)
(+2)
: The interest groups areas of
inuence fully overlap in the unique equilibrium. Still denoting  = 1 , this equilibrium
entails:
 A policy q() which is more biased towards the decision-makers ideal point than
when groups cooperate
q () =
3
 + 2
with jq ()  j  jqM ()  j; for all  2 ; (7)
 A convex rent prole U() which is strictly positive everywhere
U () =
 (   1)
 + 2
2   2C; for all  2 ;
 Contributions are convex and positive everywhere
t1 (q) = max

   1
6
q2 + q   C; 0

, t2 (q) = max

   1
6
q2   q   C; 0

with C =
3
2

22
 + 2
  1
2 + 1

< 0:
On Figures 3a and 3b, we have represented respectively the equilibrium policy and
contributions with overlapping areas of inuence for  = 2 and  = 0:2:
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Figure 3a. Policy q () - thick line,
laissez-fairepolicy - thin line, e¢ cient
policy - dashed line.
-0.2 0.0 0.2
0.2
0.4
q
Transfers
Figure 3b. Fully overlapping transfers: t1 (q)
- solid line, t2 (q) - dashed line.
Altogether, Propositions 2, 3, 4 and 5 provide some interesting comparative stat-
ics on the role of ideological uncertainty. The decision-makers rent is null only when
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there is enough ideological uncertainty compared with the degree of polarization between
groups. As ideological uncertainty diminishes, each principal secures an area of inuence
if the decision-maker is ideologically su¢ ciently close and let the other principal enjoy
unchallenged inuence if he is further away. A moderate decision-maker receives positive
contributions only when ideological uncertainty is su¢ ciently small and groups nd it
worthwhile to compete more head-to-head for the agents services, thereby raising con-
tributions and giving up some positive rent. Fully overlapping areas of inuence arise
when ideological uncertainty is very small. Interest groups compete now for all types and,
whatever his type, the decision-maker gets a positive rent.
This rent has now two sources. First, interest groups nd worthwhile bidding for the
agents services as his ideology is more certain. But now, an extra source of information
rent comes from the possibility for an extreme decision-maker to behave as being more
moderate. In fact by doing so, he would increase the ideological distance with both
principals and grasp greater contributions.
4.4.2 Weak Ideological Bias
When  < 1, the decision-makers ideology becomes less of a concern and interest groups
can now quite easily inuence his decision. Intuitively, one should expect that the resulting
equilibrium policy to be less sensitive to ideology than before. This means that as the
agent becomes more extreme, the di¤erence between his ideal point and what the nearby
principal would like to implement decreases. Filling this gap requires an increasingly lower
marginal contribution as policies become more extreme. The equilibrium contribution of
a given group is now concave and increasing as his own ideal point comes closer to that
of the decision-maker.
The next two propositions describe the di¤erent equilibrium patterns in distinguishing,
as we usually do, between the cases of a large and a small ideological uncertainty. We
comment below on the di¤erences and similarities between those two cases.
Proposition 6 : Weak Ideological Bias, Small Polarization/Large Ideological
Uncertainty. Assume that  < 1 and 1  (2 +1)
q

3(+2)
. Then, there exists 1  12
such that, for each 1 2 [ 12 ; 1); such that 1 < (2 + 1)
q

3(+2)
  (1 + 21), there
exists a continuum of equilibria which have fully overlapping inuences and entail:
 A policy q() = 3
+2
is again more biased towards the decision-makers ideal point
than when groups cooperate;
 A strictly concave rent prole U() which is zero only at both endpoints  and
21
always lower than when groups cooperate
U () =
 (1  )
 + 2
(2   2)  UM () for all  2 ;
 Contributions are strictly concave on their positive part
t1 (q) = max

0; 1  
6
q2 + q   C1

, t2 (q) = max

0; 1  
6
q2   q   C2

;
(8)
where  = 1 + 21. There exists an interval of possible values for the constants
(C1; C2). Those constants satisfy the following linear constraints:
C1 + C2 =   (1  )
 + 2
2; and Ci  3 ( + )
2
2 (2 + 1)
  
2
2
; i = 1; 2:
Turning now to the case of a small ideological uncertainty, we obtain again the unique-
ness of the equilibrium. When the ideological uncertainty is small the issue of competition
between principals dominates coordination.
Proposition 7 : Weak Ideological Bias, Large Polarization/Small Ideological
Uncertainty. Assume that  < 1 and 1 > (2 + 1)
q

3(+2)
. The unique equilibrium
has fully overlapping inuences and entails:
 An equilibrium policy q() = 3
+2
;
 A strictly concave rent prole U() which is strictly positive at both endpoints 
U () =
 (1  )
 + 2
(2   2)  2C for all  2 ;
 Contributions are strictly concave on their positive part
t1 (q) = max

0; 1  
6
q2 + q   C

, t2 (q) = max

0; 1  
6
q2   q   C

;
(9)
where  = 1   and C = 3
2

22
+2
  1
2+1

:
On Figure 4 we draw the equilibrium policy in the case of  = 1
2
and  = 1:
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Figure 4. Policy q () - thick line,
laissez-fairepolicy - thin line, e¢ cient
policy - dashed line.
When  < 1, the equilibrium shares some common features with the optimal con-
tribution and policy achieved had interest groups cooperated in designing contributions:
Everything happens as if the decision-makers ideology had a greater implicit weight in
the policy process. However, this e¤ect is magnied compared to the cooperative out-
come. The equilibrium policy comes closer to the decision-makers ideal point. Because
jq()   j  jqM()   j, the rent prole under lobbying competition is now atter. To
reduce the agents information rent, each interest group needs to shift the policy towards
the agents ideal point and, to do so, o¤ers a relatively at contribution. However, a given
interest group does not take into account that his rival also o¤ers such a at contribution
so that the equilibrium policy is already signicantly shifted towards the decision-makers
ideal point. The rent prole is excessively at compared with merged contracting.17 This
contractual externality between principals leads to an excessive bias towards the agents
ideal point compared to the case where contributions are jointly designed.
When ideology does not matter greatly to the decision-makers, the moderate ones
receive more rent than extreme ones. Exactly as when groups collude, those types may
want to look more extreme than what they really are to raise contributions. Two cases
may then arise.
If polarization is strong or ideological uncertainty is small: Head-to-head com-
petition between interest groups ensures that the equilibrium payo¤s of all players are
uniquely dened. Even the most extreme types get a positive rent out of the principals
aggressive bidding for their services.
17This revisits in the context of spatial preferences a result already found in other common agency
games with public screening devices in case where principals have monotonic preferences (see for instance
Martimort and Stole (2007)).
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If polarization is weak or ideological uncertainty su¢ ciently large: Interest
groups now become more congruent. They both want to extract as much rent as possible
from the agent. Because a moderate decision-maker can look more extreme, he must ob-
tain some rent. This congruence between competing interest groups creates a coordination
problem leading to multiple equilibria. Multiplicity a¤ects both the levels of contribu-
tions and their margins. First, there are di¤erent ways of designing contributions so that
interest groups collectively extract the rent of the most extreme types and prevent those
types from o¤ering services exclusively to the closer interest group. This coordination
problem a¤ects only the level of contributions. Second, for a given amount of ideological
uncertainty, interest groups compete more ercely for the services of the most extreme
decision-maker; with the group the further away from an extreme decision-maker having
to concede the most to get inuence. Indeed, an extreme agent nds it more attractive to
take only the contribution of the nearby group. This hardens his participation constraint
and makes him a tougher bargainer with the opposite interest group.18 As competition
for the services of an extreme decision-maker becomes tougher, the screening possibilities
of the interest group which is on the other side of the ideological space become more
limited. This increases the marginal contribution of this group.
5 Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
Let us briey recapitulate the main results of our analysis. In passing, we suggest some
testable implications that immediately follow from our work.
Ine¢ cient Policies: Under asymmetric information, competition between interest groups
leads to huge ine¢ ciencies in policy choices. There always exists a strong bias towards
the decision-makers ideal point. If ideological uncertainty is too important, transaction
costs become too large. Interest groups might prefer to eschew any contribution and leave
the decision-maker free to pursue his own ideological views.
Contributions and Segmentation of the Market for Inuence: When his ideolo-
gical bias is strong and there is enough uncertainty, interest groups may choose not to
contribute to a decision-maker whose ideal point lies too far away from their own prefer-
ences. The market for inuence is segmented with exclusive relationships between interest
groups and legislators on their side of the political spectrum. This case is likely to occur
for general policies that have a broad appeal to the public and that decision-makers value
greatly (maybe for electoral concerns), for young legislators who have not yet revealed
much on their preferences through past voting behavior, and for those who have not shown
18There remains some freedom in choosing the corresponding multiplier 1 with that multiplier being
greater if the reservation payo¤ that the agent gets by taking only one contract is steeper.
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any expertise or interest in the eld under scrutiny.
As ideological uncertainty decreases, the areas of inuence of competing groups start
to overlap. More extreme legislators keep collecting most of the contributions though
they may still receive contributions from opposite groups. One should thus expect older
decision-makers whose preferences are better known to gain more support from both sides
of the political spectrum.
If the decision-makers ideological bias is not so strong, maybe because the policy
at stake is sector specic and has little appeal for the general public, interest groups
will always contribute a positive amount. However, the nature of competition is highly
dependent on the amount of uncertainty. Interest groups are more congruent when facing
much ideological uncertainty since it becomes quite likely that their ideal policies stand
both on the same side of the decision-makers own ideal point. The main features of
the pattern of contributions then seem very much as though groups had cooperated in
designing contributions. Moderate legislators collect the bulk of contributions and rent.
Instead, with less uncertainty, competition raises contributions even for the most extreme
decision-makers.
Uniqueness of equilibria: One striking feature of the common agency game with
opposed principals is that we are able to pin down the unique natural equilibrium of the
game in many cases. We will see that when the competition between the principals is the
issue this competition leads to the unique equilibrium. In case of congruent principals
where coordination is the issue there is still an innity of equilibria even in the case of
asymmetric information. The uniqueness is in contrast with the common agency game
with complete information which is plagued by multiplicity of equilibria.
Extensions: Let us briey stress a few possible extensions of our framework. A rst one
would be to investigate what would happen with more than two interest groups. Incentives
of interest groups biased in similar directions to coalesce might be worth investigating in
such framework. On a related vein, it could be interesting to introduce some asymmetry
between principals, both in terms of how distant their ideal points are from the agents
average ideology and also in terms of their capacity to inuence the decision-maker.19
Our view of the political process has also been overly simplied by focusing on a
one-dimensional policy space. More complex multi-dimensional policy spaces and spa-
tial preferences could be investigated. Interest groups may tailor their contributions to
the particular policy dimensions they are interested in or they may make contributions
conditional on the whole array of policies. It would be worthwhile investigating whether
the strong bias towards the agents ideal point that arises under interim contracting also
occurs in those more general environments. From the earlier common agency literature
19See Epstein and OHalloran (2004) for some steps in those directions.
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under asymmetric information,20 it is well-known that the pattern of policy distortions
and rent distributions may depend on the interest groupsability to contract or not on
the whole array of policies.
It is also worthwhile investigating dynamic extensions of the model. By imposing
limits on commitment and imperfect information learning over time, such extensions may
introduce further frictions that may a¤ect patterns of contributions in interesting ways.
Finally, we have simplied our modelling of the political process assuming a unique
decision-maker. A less abstract description of legislative organizations and regulatory
agencies would require opening the black-box of those organizations. Multiagent/multiprincipals
models which are not yet developed might have some strong appeal in that respect.
All those are extensions that we hope to undertake in future studies.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 The proof is standard and thus omitted. See La¤ont and Martimort
(2002) for instance.
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 Proof of Proposition 1: To characterize the optimum with a merged principal, we
shall apply the techniques of optimal control. The implementability conditions for a prole
fU(); q()g are given by (2) and (3). We ignore the monotonicity constraint (3) in (PM)
and consider the reduced problem ( ePM) with the state variable U () and control variable
q (). The monotonicity constraint (3) is checked ex post on the solution. The program
of the merged entity is now:
( ePM) : max
fq();U()g
Z 
 

 1
2
(q()  1)2   1
2
(q() + 1)2   
2
(q()  )2   U()

d
2
;
subject to _U () = (q ()  ); (2) and _q ()  0 (4).
Denoting by  the co-state variable for (2), the Hamiltonian of ( ePM) can be written as:
H (U; q; ; ) =

 1
2
(q   1)2   1
2
(q + 1)2   
2
(q   )2   U()

1
2
+  (q   ) :
Since H (U; ; ) = max
q2R
H (U; q; ; ) and the state constraint (2) are both linear in U ,
the problem is concave in U . Therefore, the su¢ cient conditions for optimality with pure
state constraints (see Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987, Theorem 1, p. 317-319)) are also
necessary. To write these conditions, consider the following Lagrangian:
L (U; q; ; p; ) = H (U; q; ; ) + pU;
where p is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the state constraint (4). Let fU () ; q ()g
be an admissible pair which solves ( ePM). The su¢ cient conditions for optimality are:
@H
@q
= 0; for almost all ; (A1)
_U () =  (q ()  ) ; (A2)
_ () =
1
2
  p () ; (A3)
p ()U () = 0; p ()  0; U ()  0; (A4)
 ( ) =  () = 0; (A5)
where p () and  () are piecewise continuous and  () may have jump discontinuities
at  j; such that,     j   (j = 1; :::; n); and for these jumps:

 
 j
    +j  = j; j  0; (A6)
with
j = 0 if
(
either a) U ( j) > 0;
or b) U ( j) = 0 and q () is discontinuous at  j:
(A7)
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From (A1), the optimal policy is
q () =
 + 2 ()
 + 2
, for almost all : (A8)
This expression together with (A6) leads to the following useful Lemma (whose proof is
immediate):
Lemma 2 : The equilibrium policy q () and the co-state variables  () are continuous at
any interior point  2 ( ; ).  () is continuous at  =  only if q () is discontinuous
at those end-points and U() = 0.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 1. Using the su¢ cient conditions for optimality
given above, let us guess the form of the solution and check that it satises all the
conditions for optimality (A1) to (A6). Two cases are possible:
Zero rent on all : p () > 0 for all  2  implies U () = 0. Then, it is easy to see
that the quadruple
(U () ; q () ;  () ; p ()) =

0; ;


;
   2
2

satises (A1) to (A6) if and only if   2: Note that () is discontinuous at both endpoints
 1 =   2 = , with 1 = 2 = 1 > 0:
Zero rent only at endpoints: To nd the solution when  < 2, let us set p() = 0 for
all  in . The quadruple
(U () ; q () ;  () ; p ()) =

 (   2)
2 ( + 2)
 
2   2 ; 2
 + 2
;

2
; 0

;
satises (A1) to (A6) if and only if 0    2: Note again that () is discontinuous at
both endpoints  1 =   2 = , with 1 = 2 = 12 > 0:
 Lobbying Competition. Preliminaries: To characterize equilibria under interim
contracting, we rst consider the reduced problem ( ePCi ) where the monotonicity constraint
(3) is ignored. This constraint will be checked ex post on the solution of the relaxed
problem. This is now an optimal control problem with a unique pure state constraint
whose Lagrangian can be written as:
Li (U; q; i; pi; ) = Hi (U; q; i; ) + pi (U   U i()) ;
where i is the co-state variable, pi is the multiplier of the pure state constraint (5). The
Hamiltonian of ( ePCi ) is:
Hi (U; q; i; ) =

 1
2
(q   ai)2   
2
(q   )2 + t i(q)  U

1
2
+ i (q   ) :
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To characterize the solution of ( ePCi ), we shall apply the su¢ cient conditions for optimality
(see Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987, Chapter 5, Theorem 1, p. 317)) which hold when
H^i (U; i(); ) = maxqHi (U; q; i(); ) is concave in U . First, we show:
Lemma 3 : The pair ft1 (q) ; t2g is an equilibrium only if it generates a rent-policy prole
fU () ; q ()g which solves problems (PCi ) for i = 1; 2: Moreover, if t00i (q) <  + 1
i = 1; 2, then Hi (U; q; i(); ) is concave in q.
Proof: If, for the transfers ti (q), the property stated in Lemma 3 is true, then the
objective functions in problems (PCi ) are concave in q. It can be veried ex post (i.e.,
once the equilibrium schedules ti () are obtained) that the condition of Lemma 3 holds
so that the Hamiltonian is indeed concave in q.
The su¢ cient conditions for optimality ensure that there exists a pair of piecewise
continuous functions i () and pi (), and constants k  0; k = 1; :::; n; such that:
_U () =  (q ()  ) ; (A9)
@Hi
@q
(U; q; i; ) = 0; for almost all  2 ; (A10)
_i () =
1
2
  pi () ; for almost all  2 ; (A11)
pi () (U ()  U i ()) = 0; pi ()  0; U ()  U i () ; (A12)
i ( ) = i () = 0: (A13)
Moreover, i ()may have jump discontinuities at points  k, for    k  ; (k = 1; :::; n)
such that
i
 
 k
  i  +k  = k  0; (A14)
and
k = 0 if
(
either a) U ( k) > U i ( k) ;
or b) U ( k) = U i ( k) and q () is discontinuous at  k:
(A15)
Let us now use the above conditions to derive some properties of the equilibria.
Properties of the Policy Prole: Assuming strict concavity of the agents objective
function,21 the corresponding rst-order condition for the agents behavior is written as:
2X
i=1
t0i(q()) = (q()  ): (A16)
21This property will be checked ex post once the equilibrium contributions are derived.
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From (A10), we immediately get:
  ( + 1) q () + ai +  + t0 i (q ()) + 2i ()  = 0: (A17)
Using (A17), a similar equation obtained by permuting indices and (A16), we get the
following expression of an equilibrium policy:
q () =
 + 2 (1 () + 2 ()) 
 + 2
; for almost all  2 : (A18)
Also, we can generalize Lemma 2 to the case of competing principals:
Lemma 4 : The equilibrium policy q () is everywhere continuous and i () is continuous
at any interior point  2 ( ; ). If i () is discontinuous at  =  or at  =  ; then
q () is continuous and the state constraint is binding at this point.
Proof: Suppose that at an interior point  2 ( ; ) i () is discontinuous with "i =
i (
 )  i (+) > 0: Then, from (A15), q () must be continuous at  : From (A18) it is
possible only if  i () is discontinuous at  with  i ( )   i (+) =  "i: But  "i < 0,
a contradiction with (A14).
Properties of the Rent Prole: Let us now give a rst property of the rent prole
that helps limiting the investigation of the di¤erent equilibrium patterns.
Lemma 5 : The shape of the agents information rent depends on whether  is greater
or less than one:
 If   1 (resp. < 1), the agents information rent U() is concave (resp. strictly
concave) in .
 If  > 1, the information rent U() is strictly convex on a non-empty interval [1; 2]
if and only if p1 () + p2 () <
 1

for all  2 [1; 2] :
 If  = 1; the agents information rent U() is linear on a non-empty interval [1; 2]
if and only if pi () = 0 on this interval.
Proof: Using (2) and di¤erentiating w.r.t.  yields
U () =  ( _q ()  1) :
From (A11) and (A18), we get
_q () =
 + 2
 
1

  p1 ()  p2 ()

 + 2
=
3   2 (p1 () + p2 ())
 + 2
:
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Thus, we have:
U () =
2(   1   (p1 () + p2 ()))
 + 2
:
Since pi ()  0, Lemma 5 is proved.
The positiveness of the Lagrange multipliers pi () (i = 1; 2) has an important impact
on the properties of equilibria. If pi () > 0 on non-degenerate interval, the corresponding
state constraint U ()  U i() is binding on that interval, and, consequently, the transfer
ti (q()) is identically equal to zero there.
From (A17), we obtain an expression for t0i() that does not depend on t i(). For each
conguration of parameters that we consider below, (A17) uniquely denes the derivative
of the equilibrium schedule in the equilibrium range. This leads to the unique equilibrium
up to some constants of integration depending of the di¤erent possible congurations for
the sign of those Lagrange multipliers of the problems (PCi ); i = 1; 2: This is what we
will do in the next proofs.
 Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that t2(q) = 0 for all q so that U2() = 0 for all
 2 . Then, from (A18), we get that P1s best-response is to induce q() such that:
 ( + 1)q() + 1 +  + 21() = 0:
The laissez-fairepolicy q() =  is optimal when
1() =
   1
2
:
From (A11), we get
p1() =
   1
2
 0 if and only if   1:
so that the participation constraint is everywhere binding, U() = U2() = 0 on all .
Finally, we must check the transversality conditions (A13) with the possible discon-
tinuities at end-points given by (A14). Note that
1(
 )  1(+) =    1
2
=   0 if and only if   1;
1(  )  1( +) =  + 1
2
= 0  0:
Since U() = U2() = 0 on all , t1(q) = 0 for all q. Proceeding similarly for P2 ends
the proof.
 Proof of Proposition 3: Denote by 
0 = [  ;  ], the symmetric interval where both
principals o¤er null contributions:22 U() = U1() = U2() = 0 and thus q() =  on this
interval.
22It is easy to show that the interval 
0 is indeed symmetric following the same reasoning as in the
proof of Lemma 3.
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Using (A17) for principal P1, we obtain:
1() =
   1
2
for  2 
0: (A19)
Instead, we have on 
1 = [ ; ], U() = U1() > U2(). From that, we deduce that
p1() = 0 on 
1. Using the transversality condition (A13) and integrating (A11) yields:
1() =
   
2
for  2 
1: (A20)
Using the continuity of 1() at  yields
 =
   1
   1 :
Rewriting the condition that  should belong to [0; ] yields that  < 1 < .
Finally inserting the expression of 1() found in (A20) into (A18) yields:
q() =
2 + 1  
 + 1
for  2 
1: (A21)
A similar and symmetric expression is obtained for  2 
2 = [ ;  ].
To nd the expression of the equilibrium contribution, note that, on 
1, we have:
t
0
1 (q()) = (q()  ) =
((   1) + 1  )
 + 1
for  2 
1:
Manipulating yields the expression in the text.
 Proof of Proposition 4: Consider again 
0 = [  ;  ], the symmetric interval where
both principals o¤er non-negative contributions. On this interval, it must be that U() 
maxfU1(); U2()g. Moreover U() = U1() (resp. U() = U1()) only at   (resp. ).
We have p1() = 0 on (  ; ]. Using the transversality condition (A13) and integrating
(A11) yields:
1() =
   
2
for  2 (  ; ]: (A22)
Similarly, we have p2() = 0 on [ ; ) and:
2() =
 + 
2
for  2 [ ; ): (A23)
Using (A18) for principal P1 and (A22), we obtain:
 (1 + )q() + 1 +  + t02 (q()) + (   ) = 0 for  2 (  ; ]: (A24)
Similarly, using (A18) for principal P2 and (A23), we obtain:
 (1 + )q()  1 +  + t01 (q()) + ( + ) = 0 for  2 [ ; ): (A25)
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Summing (A24) and (A25) and using the agents rst-order condition yields:
q() =
3
 + 2
for  2 (  ; ): (A26)
Using (A24) and taking into account that t2(q()) = 0 on 
1 gives the following expression
of the policy on that interval:
q() =
2 + 1  
 + 1
for  2 [ ; ]: (A27)
Continuity of 2() at  is ensured when:
2 + 1  
 + 1
=
3
 + 2
or when
 =
(2 + )(1  )
(   1) : (A28)
If  > 1,  belongs to (0; ] when  < 1  (2+1)
(+2)
.
To nd the expression of the equilibrium contribution t1(q), note that using (A25)
yields for  2 
0:
t
0
1 (q) =
8>><>>:
0 if q   3
2+
;
( 1)
+2
 + ( 1)
3
q if q 2 [ 3
2+
; 3
2+
];
(   1)

q + 
+2

if q  3
2+
:
Note that t1(q( )) = 0 because U( ) = U2( ) by denition of 
2. Integrating and
taking into account that t1() = 0 is continuous at q() = 32+ yields thus the expression
in the text.
It is important to note that U() is convex and piecewise continuously di¤erentiable
prole with:
_U () =
8>><>>:
( 1)
+1

   
+2

if     ;
2( 1)
+2
 if  2 [  ;  ];
( 1)
+1

   
+2

if    :
U() is thus minimum at zero with:
U(0) =
32(   1) 2
( + 2)2
> 0:
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 Proof of Proposition 5: We are now looking for an equilibrium such that the par-
ticipation constraint U()  U2() (resp. U()  U1()) binds only at the end-point  
(resp. ). We have thus p1() = 0 on ( ; ]. Using the transversality condition (A13)
and integrating (A11) yields:
1() =
   
2
for  2 ( ; ]: (A29)
Similarly, we have p2() = 0 on [ ; ). Using the transversality condition (A13) and
integrating (A11) yields:
2() =
 + 
2
for  2 [ ; ): (A30)
Using (A18) for principal P1 and (A29), we obtain:
 (1 + )q() + 1 +  + t02 (q()) + (   ) = 0 for  2 ( ; ]: (A31)
Similarly, using (A18) for principal P2 and (A30), we obtain:
 (1 + )q()  1 +  + t01 (q()) + ( + ) = 0 for  2 [ ; ): (A32)
Summing (A31) and (A32) and using the agents rst-order condition yields:
q() =
3
 + 2
for  2 ( ; ): (A33)
Hence,
_U() =
2(   1)
 + 2
 for  2 ( ; ): (A34)
Integrating yields the expression of U() in the text.
Similarly using (A32) and (A34) yields
t
0
1 (q) =
(   1)
3
q + q for q 2

  3
 + 2
;
3
 + 2

: (A35)
Integrating and keeping the non-negative part yields the expression of t1(q) in the text.
t2(q) is obtained similarly.
Note that the condition U( ) = U2 ( ) can be rewritten as:23
(   1)
 + 2
2   C1   C2 = max

0; C2 +max
q
(   1)
6
q2   q   
2
(q + )2

; (A36)
or
(   1)
 + 2
2   C1   C2 = max

0; C2 + 3
2(2 + 1)
  
2
2

: (A37)
23A similar condition is obtained by writing the boundary condition U() = U1 ().
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But, because we must have U(0) =  C1  C2  0, the only possibility to solve (A37) is:
C1 = C2 =
322
2( + 2)
  3
2(1 + 2)
(A38)
which is a negative number (as requested by the condition U(0) =  C1   C2  0) when
1  
q
2+1
+2
but this latter condition holds since 1  (2+1)
+2
and  > 1.
 Proofs of Propositions 6 and 7: We consider an equilibrium such that the parti-
cipation constraints (5) are binding only at endpoints. For all  2 ( ; ) we have thus
p1 () = p2 () = 0: The co-state variables i () are continuous for all  2 ( ; ) but
may still have discontinuities at end-points. From (A11), we get by integrating:
i () =

2
+ i; (A39)
where 1 and 2 and are some constants. Using (A18) yields
q() =
3 + 2(1 + 2)
 + 2
: (A40)
Therefore, we get:
_U () =
2 (   1)
 + 2
 +
2(1 + 2)
2
 + 2
: (A41)
and thus
U () =
2
 + 2

(   1) (2   2)
2
+  (1 + 2) 

  2C (A42)
where C is a constant of integration.
Because of the symmetry of the model, we focus on symmetric rent prole such that
U () = U ( ) : (A43)
Using (A42), and (A43) yields necessarily:
1 + 2 = 0: (A44)
From (A40), we conclude that
q () =
3
 + 2
: (A45)
To satisfy the transversality conditions (A13) it must be that i 2
 1
2
; 1
2

. Then, ob-
serve that both co-state variables may have jumps at endpoints. Those jumps corresponds
to the binding participation constraints U() = U2() = U1() and U( ) = U2( ) =
U1( ). Denote by  C = U() = U( ) the common utility level at both endpoints .
Using (A42), the agents information rent becomes:
U () =
 (1  )
 + 2
 
2   2  2C:
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It is non-negative and concave only if   1 and C  0.
From (A17) and (A18), we get the expression of the marginal contributions o¤ered by
both principals at any equilibrium policy:
t01 (q) =  
1  
3
q + (21 + 1) and t02 (q) =  
1  
3
q   (21 + 1) (A46)
where 1 2
 1
2
; 1
2

is arbitrary. Let us dene  = 21 + 1
Integrating (A46) yields the following expressions of contributions up to some con-
stants (C1; C2):
t1 (q) =  1  
6
q2 + q   C1; and t2 (q) =  1  
6
q2   q   C2: (A47)
Those expressions are of course valid as long as contributions are positive. The corres-
ponding schedules are thus dened as:
t1 (q) = max

0; 1  
6
q2 + q   C1

and t2 (q) = max

0; 1  
6
q2   q   C2

:
(A48)
From this, it is easy to obtain the policies chosen by the agent when he contracts only
with one of the principals and the corresponding contribution is positive. These policies
are respectively given by:
q1 () =
3
2 + 1
[ + ] and q2 () =
3
2 + 1
[   ] :
Observe that q1 () > q (), and q2 () < q () :
Let us turn now to the characterization of the pairs (C1; C2). Because (5) is binding
at both endpoints, those constants must satisfy the condition
max
q

 1  
3
q2   
2
(q  )2

  C1   C2
= max

0;max
q

 1  
6
q2 + q   
2
(q   )2   C1

;max
q

 1  
6
q2   q   
2
(q + )2   C2

:
(A49)
Two cases should be considered depending on whether 2C = (1 )
+2
2+C1+C2 is negative
or null.
Zero rent at endpoints (Proposition 6), C = 0: Then (A49) can be rewritten as a
pair of conditions. The rst condition U() = 0 becomes:
C1 + C2 =   (1  )
 + 2
2: (A50)
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To satisfy the second condition U() = U1() = 0 (resp. U( ) = U2( ) = 0), we must
also have:24
Ci  max
q

 1  
6
q2 + q   
2
(q   )2

=
3( + )2
2(2 + 1)
  
2
2
: (A51)
The linear constraints (A50) and (A51) are compatible when:
1  (2 + 1)
s

3( + 2)
  (21 + 1)
which gives the upper bound in the text.
Positive rent at endpoints (Proposition 7), C < 0: The conditions U() = U1() =
 C > 0 and U( ) = U2( ) =  C > 0 yield:
  (1  )
 + 2
2   C1   C2 = 3( + )
2
2(2 + 1)
  
2
2
  C1 = 3( + )
2
2(2 + 1)
  
2
2
  C2 > 0:
This can be rewritten as
Ci =
3
2

22
 + 1
  ( + )
2
2 + 1

: (A52)
Note that, because U() = U1() =  C > U2()  0 we must have 1() = 0 which
means that necessarily 1 =  12 and  = 1  .
24It is easy to show that U() = U1() = 0 implies also U( ) = U1( ) = 0 and U( ) = U2( ) = 0
implies U() = U2() = 0.
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